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Summary:
This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in garnes
of tropical forest land appropriation. Two key questions are addressed. First, how does the structure
of the game influence the extent of deforestation? Second, under which circumstances does higher
forest appropriation by the state prornote local deforestation? Three different cases are discussed,
corresponding to a development over time towards increased forest land competition and integration
of the local community into the national economy. Particular attention is given to the assumptions
made about the local economy and the local costs of state deforestation. The local response to more
state appropriation depends critically on these assumptions, and less on the structure of the game
(Cournot or Stackelberg). The state wil fuel local deforestation if state deforestation is associated
with provision of infrastructure (roads) which reduces the local costs of agricultural expansion, or if
the local economy is isolated (autarky) and local behaviour is determined by survival needs rather
than income maximization.
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1 Introduction l
Several studies of deforestation within the political economy tradition focus on the
conflict between the state or state sponsored users and local, traditional users in the
utilization of tropical forest resources (e.g., Co1chester, 1994; Co1chester and Lohmann,
1993; Bromley and Chapagain, 1984). There have, however, been few (none?) attempts
on formal modelling of such conflicts and the strategic behaviour they may give rise to.2
This paper attempts to formalize the inter action between the state and a local
community in forest land appropriation by applying relatively simple game theoretic
models.
A central issue to be addressed is the effect on local forest clearing of higher forest
appropriation by the state. Does state deforestation stimulate or replace local
deforestation? Under which circumstances does the state fuel local "land grabbing"?
Further we want to explore the impact on the overall level of deforestation (state and
local) of different kinds of strategic interaction between the state and the local
community (structure of the game).
The models of this paper are complementary to Angelsen (1996b), which studies the
effects of external land appropriation on farmers' choices related to tenure security, and
Angelsen (1994; 1996a), which study the effects on agricultural land expansion. These
models assume parametric interaction. The present paper focuses on strategic behaviour
and interactions, that is, where the players take into account the effect of their choice on
the other player's choice of forest appropriation.
There is a substantial literature which uses game theory to study resource probIerns. A
large share of this literature analyzes resource management issues by using binary
choice models, for example, prisoner's dilemma (PD) or assurance garnes. Baland and
Platteau (1996) and Ostrom et al. (1994) are among the best examples of the usefulness
of such an approach, which -- due to its simplicity and flexibility -- can be used to study
a variety of resource garnes. The Cournot game presented in this paper can be
considered a continuous choice version of the conventional (binary choice) PD game.
The continuous choice model offers, however, a richer approach as one can study the
local response to exogenous changes in situations where one, both before and after the
change, has non-cooperation in a PD game.
Another large sub-category of the literature deals with dynamic games, which in
addition to the mult-period strategic interaction between economic agents, also
incorporates the resource dynamics (differential garnes). The latter is particularly
important in games involving renewable resources with high growth rates, for example,
fish (e.g., Levari and Mirman, 1980). In our model, which is a game of land
appropriation, this aspect is of much less relevance. Compared to the static games
studied in this paper, dynamicgames could offer additional insights by studying the
Thanks to Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Karl O. Moene, Ottar Mæstad, Karl R. Pedersen, Ussif
Rashid Surnaila, and Ame Wiig and other colleagues at CMI for comments to a draft vers ion
of the paper.
2 A comprehensive review by Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1997) on economic models of
deforestation does not find any such models.
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interaction over time. The approach of this paper is, however, to explore the
implications of the underlying assumptions in relatively simple garnes rather than to use
simplistic assumptions in more complex, dynamic garnes. Hopefully, static (Cournot) or
simple sequential (Stackelberg) garnes reveal important structures and incentives of
real-life gares which, obviously, are dynamic.
A critical assumption for applying game theoretic models of only two players is that the
local community and the state can be viewed as single actors. Are there mechanisms, for
example, in terms of local resource management institutions, uniform ways of thinking
and responding, etc. within the local community which make it appropriate to study the
local community as one agent? Jf not, the situation is better studied as one of open
access, that is, games with a very large number of players. As is well known from the
literature, the N ash-Cournot equilbrium converges to the competitive market
equilibrium when the number of players increases. The latter situation has already been
discussed in Angelsen (1994; 1996a). The game models of this paper explore another
extreme with only two players. Thus the models of the present and the complementary
papers analyze two extreme situations, while we keep in mind that actual behaviour
shows great variation between these.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two presents the basic elements of the
models. Three different cases or games are discussed in the following sections. In
section three we focus on a poor, isolated loe al community. The interaction with the
state is studied as a static game with simultaneous moves (Cournot). Section four
discusses a situation with higher forest land scarcity and a local-led land race, that is, the
local community is the leader in a Stackelberg game. Section five analyzes a case with
intense resource scarcity and competition, and a local community integrated into the
regional/national economy. The state is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader in this
case. Section six compares the different cases, discusses possible developments over
time in the local response, and the possibilties for cooperation in forest management.
The final section concludes.
2 PrelIminaries
We consider a given forest area (HT) which has three uses: it can be converted to
agricultural land by the local community (HL), to plantations, logging or other large
scale projects by the state (Hs), or it can remain virgin/naturallprimary/pristine/
old-growth forest (HF).
(1) HT =HL+Hs +HF
We assume that the state and local community each choose the level of HS and HL,
respectively. New forest land is allocated on a first-come-first-served-basis.3
3 Forest clearing may give more permanent land rights, as assumed in model iv in Angelsen
(1996a). In this case the income and cost variables should be interpreted as discounted
values. Tenure insecurity could then be included by reducing the discounted values, a
practice known as risk discounting. If local tenure security is inversely related to the level of
state appropriation (as in the model of endogenous tenure security in Angelsen, 1996b), this
could also be included in the model in a relatively straightforward manner. To keep the
2
Local income
The income to the local community and the state are functions of land area converted for
their own use, as well as the remaining natural forest. The local forest benefits of
primary forest would be in the form of non-timber forest products and various protective
functions, whereas the state would benefit from it in the form of, for example,
eco-tourism and protective functions, as well as more intangible benefits such as
existence values and a green image.4 The net income to the local community is given by;
(2) L = l(HL,Hs) = r(HL) + t(HF) - J~L c(HT - HS -x, HS)dx
r(HL) is the gross revenue of forest clearing for agricultural production, for simplicity
assumed to be a function of land area on ly (decisions about, for example, labour input
are not included). t( HF) gives the income from primary forest as a function of total forest
area. We do not distinguish between gross and net benefits of virgin forest. We assume
decreasing returns, for example, because land is of heterogeneous quality (t¡, r¡ ;: O, t¡l'
ru .. O).
The last element in (2) gives the aggregate cost of agricultural production. The
properties of the local cost function are critical for some of the later results. c(HF,Hs) is
the marginal costs of land expansion. First, a larger primary forest area wil reduce the
costs as new land is more easily available (c¡ .. O), but this effect is diminishing (cu ;:
O). Second, state forest clearing has a cost reducing effect on the marginal costs of
expansion, as it provides infrastrueture, particularly roads (c2 .. O), also at a decreasing
rate (C22 ;: O). The net effect of increased state appropriation on the costs is therefore
ambiguous: a~s = C2 - Cl ~O . A land scarcity effect increases the marginal costs,
whereas an infrastructure effect reduces the cost of agricultural land expansion. From
the assumptions made, the first effect will increase relative to the second as HS
increases: a~~s = Cll + C22 ;: O .5 We then have three possibilties: (1) the expression (c2 -
c¡) is negative for all relevant combinations of HS and HL, (2) it is positive for all
relevant combinations, and (3) it is negative for low levels of HS (and HL) and positive
for high leveIs. Intuitively, the last two possibilities appear to be the most realistic ones.
State income
The state revenue is determined in a similar manner, except that loe al fores t clearing
does not have any cost reducing effects through provision of infrastrueture. We assume
focus on the main mechanisms of the game we shall, however, abstract from the issue of
tenure insecurity, noting that the chosen model formulation can be given alternative
interpretations.
4 Virgin forest is to be considered a public good both in the sense that there is no rivalry
between local and state uses in consumption of services deri ved from a certain virgin forest
area, and exclusion is impossible. (The latter requirement is, in fact, redundant as there
would be no incentive to exclude others since there is no rivalry and the public good is
provided for free.) Note that the non-rivalry assumption relates to the two actors in our
model at the aggregate level, and not, for example, between vilagers in the utilzation of
fuelwood from a given forest area. Finally, we note that the total forest benefits depend on
total virgin forest area; thus there is rivalry in land allocation.
5 We assurne C¡2 = C2I = O.
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that the state is only concerned with maximizing own income (a predatory state) and not
total income (a developmental state). This assumption is discussed further in case 1 and
relaxed in Appendix 1.
(3) HSS = s(Hs,HL) = v(HS) + g(HF) - Jo h(HT -HL -y)dy
v() is the gross income from forest appropriation by the state, whereas g() is the state's
benefits from primar forest. The benefit functions are strictly concave (g ¡, v ¡ ;: O, g u'
Vu .. O). The marginal co st of forest appropriation, h(HF), is lower the larger the area of
virgin forest, but this effect is diminishing (h¡ .. O, hu ;: O).
The formulation in (1) implicitly assumes that state and local land uses are mutually
exclusive. This may be a fair assumption for land uses which involves forest clearing
and permanent use of the land, for example, permanent agriculture, plantations,
hydropower and infrastructure developments. For other uses, particularly logging, this
may not be the case. Logging companies are basically interested in the big trees, not the
land. Farmers' main interest is in the land (soil) for cultvation. Thus, as observed
throughout Asia, shifting cultivators may follow in the wheel tracks and clear logged
forest. Related to our model, this could be interpreted as each hectare of state
deforestation having astrong infrastrueture component; the infrastrueture effect wil be
strong relative to the land scarcity effect (c2 - c¡ .. O).
Three key assumptions
We identify three critical assumptions in the modelling of state local interactions, cf.
also Appendix 2: (i) the effect of state deforestation on local expansion cost, (ii) the
degree of openness of the local economy, and (iii) the structure of the game. Each of
these reflects the empirical variation found in developing countries, and they are briefly
examined below.
First, the effect of state forest appropriation on the marginal costs of local forest
clearing, as discussed above. The strength of the land scarcity effect v. the infrastructure
effect of higher state forest clearing depends on particularly two factors. In a forest
abundant situation the infrastructure effect wil be relatively stronger, as included in the
assumptions about the cost function. It also depends on the type of forest conversion by
the state: logging has a stronger infrastructure component relative to area directly
cleared compared to, for example, plantations or commercial agriculture.
Second, the openness of the local economy. As shown elsewhere (Angelsen, 1996a), the
response of farm households depends critically on the market assumptions. In particular,
it is crucial whether an off-farm labour market exists or not, for example, through
migration, such that the opportunity costs of labour can be taken as exogenous in the
modeL. In that case the model becomes recursive: the produetion decisions can be
separated from the consumption decisions and studied as a profit maximizing problem.
If some prices are not market-determined, the produetion and consumption decisions
must be solved simultaneously and the behaviour of the local community is studied as a
utility maximizing problem; see Angelsen (1996a) for a further discussion.
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The distinction between profit and utility maximizing local behaviour relates
particularly to the labour market assumptiòn. This depends, inter alia, on the openness
of the local economy and the existence of an off-farm sector and its size relative to the
agriculture/forestry sec tor. It also relates to the time horizon for the analysis; the small,
open economy assumption is relatively more relevant for long term analysis when
migration is an option. In the first two cases we assume a local autarky, i.e., the local
community's deforestation decisions are studied as a utility maximizing problem. In the
third we use the conventional profit-maximizing approach, which corresponds to the
small, open economy assumption.
Third, the structure of game. We analyze three types of games. In the first case we
assume a static game with simultaneous moves (Cournot). Then we look at sequential,
two period games (Stackelberg). In the sec ond case the local community moves first
(leader) and the state second (follower). In the third case, we reverse the sequence, and
let the state be the leader.
In each game we study the Nash equilibrium, being defined as "a set of strategies, one
for each player, such that given the strategies being played by others, no player can
improve her pay-off by adopting an alternative strategy" (Heap et al.) 1992: 101). The
equilibrium in the Cournot game is often referred to as the Nash, Nash-Cournot or
Cournot equilibrium; we use the term Cournot equilibrium as all equilibria studied in
this paper (inc1uding Stackelberg) are Nash equilbria.
The Cournot equilibrium is at times referred to as a zero conjecture or independent
adjustment equilibrium; the players do not expect any change in the opponents decision
variable when they change their own decision variable, and the equilibrium is reached
after an adjustment proeess. An alternative, more appropriate and "modern"
interpretation of how the equilibrium is reached is the following: when the players move
simultaneously, both assume the other to make a rational choice, they have rational
expectations about the opponents choice, and then both select simultaneously the best
strategy given that the opponent does the same.
The structure of the game is similar to a standard Cournot game of duopoly (e.g.,
Shapiro, 1989; Friedman, 1983), and have also similarities to games of public goods
provision (e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1986).6 A special feature of this paper is a careful
specification of the local objective function (preferences and market assumption) and
the cost structure, and the analysis shows that conventional conc1usions from this
literature cannot readily be replicated in state-local resource games.
In a leader-follower or Staekelberg game, the follower observes the leader's choice and
chooses the optimal strategy based on that in a similar manner as in the Cournot game.
6 Whereas there are some similarities with the standard duopoly garnes, one should also note
some important differences. First, there is no competition in an output market in our model,
on ly in forest appropriation. Second, and related to the first, there is no price as such in the
model; thus we only have garnes of quantity competition. Third (and more relevant to
dynamic models), there are no separation between investment and produetion decisions, as
the income is a function of only land investments (forest clearing). Fourth, as will be seen
below, the local response curve may be forward bending.
5
The leader, choosing first, anticipates the response of the follower, and includes the
follower's response in his optimization problem.
Three cases
As already indicated, formal modelling of state-loe al interactions in forest resource use
represents a new research area. It is therefore hard to find factual evidence for which
games that will apply in different empirical contexts. Even in empirical research it may
be difficult to reve al the exact structure of the game and the sequence of the moves.
Indeed, this is a general problem in applying game theory: the theory provides few
empirically verifiable criteria for which structure of the game that should be assumed in
the modeL. The discussion of the empirical relevance of the different structures of the
game therefore becomes somewhat tentative, and c1early calls for further investigations.
ane argument could be that the Stackelberg games represent situations where one of the
players is more aggressive than the other.
By varying the three key assumptions discussed above we get 12 different games, cf.
Appendix 2. We have chosen to focus on three cases. The case studies have been
selected partly based on their perceived empirical relevance, and partly to review the
implications of different assumptions: how robust are the conclusions to variations in
the assumptions?
Case 1 deals with a poor, isolated local community, where the interaction with the state
is studied as a Cournot game. Case 2 discusses a situation with higher fores t land
scarcity and a local-led land race, that is, the local community is the leader in a
Stackelberg game. Case 3 analyzes a situation with intense resource scarcity and
competition, and a local community integrated into the regional/national economy. The
state is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader in this case. In some respects, the three
cases correspond to a possible development over time in terms of (i) increased resource
scarcity, (ii) increased integration of the local community in the regional/national
economy, and (iii) more aggressive behaviour by one of the players.
3 Case 1: Poor, isolated local community
In the first case we consider the interaction between state and local deforestation in the
context of a poor, isolated local community. This case could describe the situation for
many tribal communities. Their livelihood, based on forest income from hunting,
gathering and extensive forms of agriculture such as long-fallow shifting cultivation, is
bein g undermined as the area of natural forest dec1ines through state appropriation.
Examples of this situation are found in the Amazon and Southeast Asia, e.g., Colchester
and Lohmann (1994).
We have identified three key assumptions in state - local games: the type of game, the
local economy, and the local cost effects of state deforestation. In the poor, isolated
local community case we assume the following for each of these.
Type of game: The most difficult assumption relates to the type of game that should be
modelled; it is hard a priori to determine the game formulation that most realistically
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describe the situation. We shall analyze a Cournot game in this case, that is, a static
game with complete information, and both players choose their strategy simultaneously.
Local economy: In our case when the local community is isolated, the utility
maximizing approach is the relevant one. We make the assumption that all income is
derived from agriculture and direct forest uses (no off-farm income).
Local cost structure: Poor, isolated forest communities are normally associated with
forest abundance, which suggest that the infrastructure effect wil dominate. The
technological level among such communities -- most transport is done by foot --
implies, however, that they may not make much use of state provided infrastructure. We
shall therefore not make any a priori assumptions about which effect dominates.
The state 's respons e curve
The objective of the state is to maximize income as given in (3). The state wil then
choose the amount of land for plantations, logging, etc. such that the following first
order condition is satisfied;7
(4) Sl =Vi-gi-h(HF)=O
The first element gives the marginal gross income from forest conversion, whereas the
last two are the costs in terms of reduced forest benefits (opportunity costs) and the
direct costs related to forest clearing.
The optimal amount of land clearing by one agent is a function of the amount
appropriated by the other. We define the optimal levels of HS as a function of the local
community's choice, i.e., the response or reactionfunction for the state;
(5) HS* = HS(HL)
To explore the characteristics of the response function, we differentiate (4) to obtain;
(6) dHS* 812dHL 811
gii+h¡ .. O
v l1+g11+hi
The response curve of the state of backward sloping in an HL - HS diagramme for two
reasons. More local forest clearing implies that the remaining fores t becomes more
valuable, i.e., the net marginal benefits of virgin forest (gn) and the opportunity costs of
conversion increase. Further, the marginal costs of forest conversion wil be higher as
the remaining forest is less suitable or accessible (h¡).
The iso-profit curves for the state are defined by setting S = S . The shape of the curves
is found by total differentiation of (3);
(7) dHL _ -~ _dHS - 82-
vi-gi-h(.)
HS
-g I+Jo hidy
Whereas the response curve shows the optimal response to changes in the other player's
choice, the iso-profit curves simply show the change necessary to maintain the same
7 It follows from the assumptions made that SIl -: O.
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income. S2 is always negative, whereas s¡ is positive for small values of HS, zero in
optimum (cf. (4)), and negative for larger values. Thus the staters iso-profit curves wil
therefore be inverted C-shaped in an HL_Hs diagramme.
We have assumed a rather narrow objective function for the state, in the way that only
own income is maximized. The implications of including local income in the state's
objective function (a developmental state) are examined in Appendix 1. Under realistic
assumptions the response curve wil stil be downward sloping, but the location and
slope wil change. Jf the land scarcity effect dominates, for example, the curve wil
move downwards. Nevertheless, since the qualitative results only depend on the slope of
the response curve we do not pursue the case with a more developmental state.
The loeal respons e eurve
Local behaviour is studied as a problem of balancing the utility of consumption and the
disutility of labour. This is known as the Chayanovian model in agricultural economics.
The co st related to agricultural expansion and cultivation is expressed in terms of
labour; c(HF,Hs) therefore represents the labour input required for a marginal expansion
of agricultural land. Formally , the problem is one of maximizing;
(8) U = U(r(HL) + t(HF), J~L c(HT - HS - x, HS)dx ) = U (HL , HS)
We assume the utility function to be well-behaved, cf. Angelsen (1996a). The optimality
condition is given by;
(9) Ul =O~ri -ti -zc(HT -Hs-HL*)=O; z=_uzUl
Net marginal income from forest conversion (r¡ - ti) should in optimum equal the
marginal labour requirement for land expansion multiplied by the shadow wage rate (z).
z can also be given the interpretation as the vIrtual price of labour. As discussed in
Angelsen (1996a: appendix 1), the use of virtual prices facilitates the comparative
statics. The substitution effect is given by keeping z constant, whereas the income effect
is determined by the change in z.
(9) implicitly defines the optimal local deforestation (HL') as a function of HS, or the
response function.
(10) HU = HL(Hs)
The inverse of the slope of the response curve HL _Hs diagramme is;
(11) dHU - _~ - tll-Z(C2-e¡)-c(.ZHS)o O. S = .l L = .ldHS - Ull - rii+tii+ze¡-C(')Zf/L .. , ZH - dHS,ZH - dHL
The denominator in (11) is negative, corresponding to the second order conditions for
maximum (uii .. O). The response of the local community to higher HS, i.e., the sign of
u12 is ambiguous. The analysis of the sign of the numerator in (11) is done in two steps.
In the first stép, we assume that Z is fixed, corresponding to a small open economy
approach (only substitution effects apply). There are three effects to consider. First,
more land appropriated by the state means that the net marginal benefits of virgin forest
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increases (t11)' I.e., the opportunity costs of agricultural conversion increases. Second,
the marginal costs of land expansion wil be higher as the remaining forest is less
suitable for agricultural production or is less accessible (c¡). Third, state clearing
provides infrastructure which has the opposite effect on land expansion (c2). Jf the latter
effect is sufficiently large, the response may be positive. As shown above, the third
(infrastrueture) effect wil be relatively larger to the second (land scarcity) effect the
lower the level of HS, whereas the impact on the first effect cannot be determined from
the assumptions made. However, we can conclude that if the infrastrueture effect is
sufficiently strong the expression (t11 - z(c2 - c)) in (10) wil be positive.
In the second step, we must also consider the effect of changes in the shadow wage rate
(z), which reflects the income effects. We always have ZHL ;: O as higher HL increases
income and labour input, both of which augment the shadow wage rate. The effect of
higher HS is more complicated. Assuming additive utility (Un = U2¡ = O), we get;
(12)
HLU22UIJ (cz-cl)dx+UIiUzt¡o :; OZHS = 2 ~
Ul
There are two different effects on z. First, higher HS affects the total costs as shown by
the first element in the numerator. Jf the land scarcity effect is strong (e2 - c ¡ ;: O), more
state deforestation implies higher labour input and therefore higher z. If the
infrastructure effect is strong, however, more state deforestation wil reduce z. Second,
higher HS wil reduce the income by lowering the primary forest area, which reduces z.
In the case where the infrastrueture effect is strong, (12) is therefore unambiguously
negative.
In the case of small infrastructure effects, (12) may be positive or negative. I have in
Angelsen (1996a; 1996c) used and discussed an additive utility function with a
subsistence consumption leveL. This formulation gives, in accord with economic
intuition, that the income effect dominates the substitution effect when consumption is
close to the subsistence leveL, or when the preferences are such that marginal utility of
consumption above the subsistence level is rapidly declining. This implies that the
absolute value of Ull wil be large and the second element in the numerator dominates.
Hence in poor local communities we could expect Zw .. O.
Returning to the numerator of (11), there is now a fourth effect to con sider related to the
change in z (income effect). A lower z wil pull in the direction of more local forest
conversion as the (subjective) costs are lowered; a higher z wil reduce local
deforestation.
In summary , if the infrastructure or the income effects (or both) are strong, we get a
forward bending local response curve (un ;: O). In our case we have assumed the local
community to be poor, which implies strong Ïncome effects. The qualitative response
wil in this case be as in a "full belly" model, that is, when the local preferences are such
that they minimize labour efforts given a subsistence target. 8
8 An extreme vers ion of the utility maximizing approach is to assurne that the local
community has lexicographic preferences: the households shall reach a subsistence level of
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The loe al indifference curves are defined by setting U = U, and the curvature is found
by differentiation of (8);
(13) dHS _ _!! _dHL - Ul-
r¡-ti-ze(.)
HL
-ti-Z Jo (c2-c¡)dx
U¡ goes from being positive to negative as HL increases, and is zero in optimum. The
shape of the indifference curves depends on the sign of u2' which may be either positive
or negative. When the infrastructure effect is small, u2 .. O. The local iso-profit curves
are then inverted U-shaped.
Note that the conditions for inverted U-shaped indifference curves are not the same as
the condition for a backward bending response curve, although they are related. The
latter condition (u12 .. O) concerns the effect of higher state clearing on the marginal
uti lit Y of local agricultural expansion, whereas the first (u2 .. O) reflects the effect on
total utility. Moreover, the sign of u12 is influenced by the relative strength of the income
effect, whereas u2 is not.
Given our assumptions about the cost function, it is possible for a certain range of
values of HS that u12 .. O and u2 ;: O. In addition, it may well be that the infrastructure
effects are small (u2 .. O) but that the response curve is forward bending due to strong
income effects (U12 ;: O). To simplify the presentation, we shall in the following assume
a forward bending response curve due to strong income effects and that the indifference
curves are inverted U-shaped, i.e., there are small infrastrueture effects of state
deforestation.
Cournot equilibrium
The Cournot equilbrium is given where the two response curves intersect (A) in Figure
1. This is the only point where the leve! of fores t clearing, for both players, is the best
reply to the level chosen by the other. In other words, there is consistency for both
players between their own optimal leve! of forest clearing and the level chosen by the
other.
consumption or income (Q) at minimum labour costs ("full belly" preferences). The
optimization problem is very simple in this case: the local community gets a basic income
from natural forest, t( HF), and then clears as much forest as required to reach the subsistence
target, given by r(HL) + t(HF) = Q. This also defines the response curve of the local
community. Differentiation yields the in vers e of the slope of the response curve; dHL*/dHs =
ti / (ri - ti) :; O, i.e., the response curve is forward sloping. More state deforestation reduces
the local forest income, and this has to be compensated for by expanding agricultural land
area. The slope depends on the marginal income from the two types of land use. If the
marginal benefits from non-timber forest products are small relative to the benefits from
agricultural land, state forest clearing only has modest effect on local agricultural expansion.
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HS
response curve for the local community
L.
H
Figure 1: The response curves for the local community and the state in the poor,
isolated community case.
The condition for stabilty of the system iS;9
(14) UiiSIl - UIZSIZ;: O
As seen from (11) and (6), we have Ull' sn' S12 .. O; Ull .. u12 Sl1 .. S12' It then follows
that the necessary condition for a stable equilibrium is met. Graphically, this implies that
the local response curve, when moving south, must intersect with the state's response
curve from above.
Consider an exogenous shift in the state's response curve, represented by the dotted line
in the figure. For any given value of HL the state wants to appropriate more land than
before. This could be due to, for example, higher prices of plantation products,
technological progress, or less value attached to virgin forest. The local response wil be
more forest clearing, and the new equilbrium is in point B.
State deforestation fuels local deforestation in this case. The main mechanism is that
state appropriation of forest reduces loca! forest income, which must be compensated
for by expanding the local agricultural area. Jf state deforestation in addition provides
infrastructure such that the cost of agricultural expansion is reduced, this gives an
additional argument for local land expansion.
An ilustration of the empirical relevance of this case is given in a review of local
studies on poverty and tropical forest degradation by Kates and Haarmann (1992). They
identify two major sources of displacement of indigenous hunter-gatherers or poor
farmers; one is by (state-sponsored) commercial activities, the other by spontaneous
immigrants or government planned resettlement programmes. This leads to degradation
of forest resources on which the traditional users depend, and forces them to expand
their activities into new forest areas.
9 See, for example, Shapiro (1989: 386)
11
4 Case 2: Increased forest land competition; local-led land race
When fores t land scarcity and competition increases, one possibility is that we move
from a Cournot game to a Stackelberg game with the local community as the leader and
the state as the follower. This game would then describe a race for primary forest where
the local community is the "aggressive" player, and clear forest in order to squeeze the
state. As discussed towards the end of this section, this game could describe an
important aspect of the process of deforestation in many locations in Indonesia and
Latin America.
Why is it fair to assume the local community to be a Stackelberg leader? Besides the
need to test the implications of different game assumptions, there are some reasons that
make the case with the loe al community as the leader a relevant one to study. One could
argue that the local community has greater flexibilty than the state in adjusting its forest
clearing, for example, because the state's decisions must move through a bureaucracy,
and often require heavy capital investments. Further, the local community may know the
decision procedures of the state, and therefore be able to prediet the state's actions.
We make no a priori assumptions about the loca! economy, and discuss the autarky
(utility maximizing) case which could be considered the most generalone as both
income and substitution effects are present. We further assume in this game that the land
scarcity effect of state deforestation is large compared to the infrastructure effects. This
is related to the type of game studied; the Stackelberg game with a local leader appears
to be most reasonable in a situation where state deforestation is costly to the local
community (cf. Appendix 2).
Loeal behaviour and the Staekelberg equilibrium
The problem for the local community as a leader is to maximize utility as given in (8),
subject to the response function for the state as given in (5). The state wil as a follower
be on its response curve. The optimal level of forest clearing by the local community is
such that the following condition is met;
dHs, dHs" JHL J
(15) Ul+U2dHL =r¡-t¡-zc(.)+ dHLL-ti-z o (c2-ci)dx =0
The first part of the expression (u¡) is similar to the Cournot case, cf. (9). In addition, the
local community takes into account the state's response on local forest clearing, dHS: .. O.dH
In the case where state deforestation is costly to the local community (the land scarcity
effect dominates), u2 .. O and the indifference curves are inverted U-shaped in the HL_Hs
diagramme, cf. (13). Compared to a Cournot game we have added a negative element in
the optimality condition. Local forest clearing has become less costly on the margin
because local deforestation reduces state deforestation, which both increase the forest
income (t¡) and reduces the costs of agricultural expansion.
The Staekelberg equilibrium is presented in Figure 2. The local community's preferenee
direction is south, and the equilibrium is gÏven in point B where the 10cal indifference
curve tangents the state's response curve.
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Figure 2: Local community as the leader in a Stackelberg game.
Compared to a Cournot equilibrium (A), the local community wil clear more and the
state less forest. The local community is aware of its strategic position as the leader, and
uses it to "squeeze the state" from converting as much forest as the state would have
done in a Cournot game.
A Stackelberg game with the local community as the leader gives more overall
deforestation compared to a Cournot game as the absolute value of the slope of the
state's response curve is less than one. The local community wil receive a higher uti lit y,
whereas the state's profit wil be lower in B compared to A. Note that the above results
do not depend on the slope of the local response curve; hence the conclusions so far are
valid both in situations where either income or substitution effects dominate.
LoeaZ response to higher state deforestation
The effect of an exogenous upward shift in the state's response function is found by
differentiation of (15);
(16) dHL* _dHS -
dHS* iJ(dHS* IdHL)UI2+-;UZZ+ iJHS U2
,/HS* iJ(dHS* IdHL)UII+ dHL UZI+ iJHL uz
dHS* (JHL JHL J iJ(dHS* IdHL) (JHL Jtll-Z(C2-C¡)-COZHS+-; ti¡-Z o (C22+CI¡)lÚ-ZHS o (C2-Ci)dx + iJHS -ti-z o (ci-c¡)dx
/HS* ( JHL ì iJ(daS* IdHL) (JHL ì
rli+tli+zCI-COXHL+'dHL tli-Z(Ci-C¡)-ZHL o (ci-c¡)dx t iJHL -t¡-z o (ci-c¡)dx)
We assume the denominator to be negative (second order conditions for maximum). The
numerator consists of three terms. The first term, which gives the Cournot response (u¡)
can be either negative or positive. We show ed in the analysis of case 1 that if both the
infrastrueture and the income effects are small, this effect is negative. We are now
considering the case when the infrastructure effect is small, hence the sign depends on
the strength of the income effect relative to the substitution effect.
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The second term relates to the change in the local costs (benefits) of higher (lower) state
clearing. Consider first the case when z is determined exogenously (small, open
economy). For a given slope of the state's response curve, more state clearing implies
that on the margin, state clearing is more costly to the local community. However, as
higher local forest clearing reduces state clearing, this effect wil push in the direction of
higher local deforestation. The gain from squeezing the state is higher.
Then we must take into account that z wil change in an autarky. As argued earlier, if the
income effect is weak, then zyS ;: O, and the sec ond effect in (16) is unambiguously
positive (U22 .. O). If, on the other hand, the income effect is sufficiently strong, the sign
wil change.
The third term relates to the changes in the slope of the state's response curve. From the
assumptions madeCJ(dHs*/dHL)/CJHs: determine the sign of this effect.
denotes the change in the slope of the response curve as one moves north. If this is
negative, i.e., the response curve becomes steeper, the "state squeeze per hectare local
forest clearing" is higher, hence the third effect is positive and this contributes to higher
HL following an increase in HS.
Thus, we cannot in general determine the sign of (16). Intuitively, one could expect the
first and most direct effect to dominate over the sec ond and third. This wil be the case if
the slope of the state's response curve is close to zero (second effect small), and the
slope of the state's response curves in the relevant region is relatively constant (third
effect small).
In the case with small income effects the first effect is negative, the sec ond positive,
whereas the third is ambiguous. If we maintain that the first effect dominates the second
and third, we conclude that higher state deforestation gives less local deforestation.
In the case when the income effects are dominating, e.g., the consumption is close to the
subsistence level, the picture is reversed. In this case the first effect is positive and the
sec ond is negative. Now we could expect that higher state forest clearing also gives
more local deforestation, as in case 1.
Empirieal relevanee
Two major conclusions emerge from the analysis of this case. First, compared to a
Cournot game there wil be more local and less state deforestation, and more overall
deforestation. The local community gains and the state loses compared to a Cournot
game. These results do not depend on the relative strength of the income and
substitution effects.
Second, the local response to an exogenous increase in state deforestation is similar to
case 1. Jf there are strong income effects, the res ult is more deforestation. More state
deforestation reduces forest income, and the need to meet a subsistence target dominates
in local decisions, thus agricultural land expansion wil increase. Jf the income effects
are small, or we are in the open economy case where only substitution effects apply,
then more state deforestation implies less local deforestation, as local land expansion
has become more costly.
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The local community uses its position as the leader to squeeze the state, as expressed by
the difference between point B and A in Figure 2. Such a local-led land race that results
from a change in the local strategy (from Cournot to Stackelberg leader) has been
observed empirically. The development since the mid-1980s in the Seberida district in
Sumatra could be interpreted as such a shift (Angelsen, 1995). The local community is
not just passively adopting to forest appropriation by the state, but they play strategically
in the way that they clear forest that otherwise could have been appropriated by the state.
Similar land races have frequently been observed at the forest frontier in Latin America
(see Kaimowitz (1995) for a review of Central America).
Note that there are several different "strategic" effects involved in land races. First, there
may be speculative motives in the way that forest is cleared for later sale to get capital
gains ("rational bubbles"). Second, when fores t clearing gives farmers land rights, there
are' incentives to clear forest beyond the point where the current land rent is zero, cf.
model iv in Angelsen (1996a). Third, and the effect studied in this paper, local
deforestation might be expanded to squeeze other actors.
It may be difficult in empirical research to isolate the different effects. The present paper
should therefore be seen as complementary to other explanations of how a race for forest
land can be initiated and maintained.
5 Case 3: Fierce land competition; the state as the leader
As a third case we discuss a situation where the competition for forest land is strong,
and the local economy is well integrated into the regional/national strong economy.
Compared to the two previous cases, onecould think of this case to describe the
situation at a later stage in the economic development of a region or a country. This
game could therefore be used to ilustrate the interaction between the state and local
communities in central parts of, for example, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand,
where there is relatively little forest left and farmers are well integrated into markets.
Related to our main assumptions, this situation implies that the land scarcity effect
dominates the infrastrueture effect in the local costs function, and that we can assume a
perfeet labour market and study the local adaptation as a profit maximizing problem.
We assume that the gare played is a Staekelberg game with the state as the leader. The
following story could provide an argument for this to be areasonable assumption. The
three cases presented may represent a historical development. Assume that the state as a
response to the game in case 2 wants to be the leader, which means we enter a period of
Staekelberg warfare, as discussed in more details in Appendix 3. There wil be
excessive forest clearing when the warfare is going on. 
10 Both actors would gain by
mo ving back to their response curves, but it would be even better if the other player
gives in. The Staekelberg warfare could therefore be studied as a chicken game. The
state may have higher credibilty in claiming to be the leader, for example, in the form
of irreversible commitments to a certain level of forest clearing. Hence we may
eventually end up in a Staekelberg game with the state as the leader.
JO As wil be seen, the conclusion that the state wil c1ear more as a leader compared to the
Cournot equilbrium assurnes that the local response curve is backward bending.
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Loeal behaviour
The behaviour of the local community is under the open economy assumption studied as
an income maximization problem, with the local income given in (2). This gives the
following optimality condition;
(17) li=ri-tl-C(HF,Hs)=O
The inverse of the slope of the response curve is given by;
(18) dHL*dHS
ll2 tli+ci-C2 O
--= ..
lii rl¡+tll+C¡
The local response curve is backward bending as we have assumed that land scarcity
effect dominates infrastrueture effect (112 .. O).
State behaviour and the Staekelberg equilibrium
The objective of the state is to choose its leve! of HS such that the revenue given in (3) is
maximized, taking into account the respons e of the local community as given in (18);
(19) Max S = s(Hs,HL(Hs))
The revenue is maximized when;
dRU F dHU ( JHS J(20) si+s2dHS =Vi-gi-h(H)+ dHS -gi+ o h1dy =0
This is a modified vers ion of the optimality condition in the Cournot game, cf. (4). The
state now takes in to account the effect on local clearanee when deciding its own leve! of
deforestation, given by dHL; .. O. One hectare reduced local deforestation always increasedff
the net benefits to the state (S2 .. O).
Figure 3 ilustrates this case. The Stackelberg equilibrium wil be where the (highest
possible) iso-profit curve is tangent to the response curve of the local community, that
is, in point B. Compared to the Cournot solution (A), the present gare gives more forest
clearing by the state and less by the loe al community. The intuition behind these results
is straightforward, and paralleI to case 2. Forest conversion by the state is less costly to
the state because it knows that local deforestation is reduced when its own increases.
The state uses its strategic position to squeeze the local community. The distance
between A and B (measured on the x-axis) gives the optimal "squeeze" of loe al forest
appropriation. As the absolute value of the slope of the local response curve is greater
than one, the Staekelberg solution also implies higher total forest clearing and reduced
HF.
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Figure 3. State as the leader in a Stackelberg game: backward hending local respons e
curve.
We also note that the income to the state is higher compared to a Cournot equilibrium,
whereas it is lower for the local community. As is generally known from the oligopoly
and game theoretic literature, there is a first-mover advantage in games where quantities
are the decision variables: the leader could have chosen the Cournot quantity if it were
to yield higher income. The last-mover disadvantage is seen both by studying the
iso-profit curves, and from the fact that both HL and HF are smaller in the Stackelberg
modeL.
A positive exogenous shift in the revenue function of the state (iso-profit curves shift
upwards) wil obviously make the loca! community reduce its forest clearing. Total
deforestation wil, however, increase as the slope of the local response curve is greater
than minus one, i.e., the reduction in loca! deforestation is less than the increase in state
deforestation.
It is common that national governments view forest clearing by local farmers as the real
problem of deforestation, sometimes referred to as "unplanned" deforestation, whereas
"planned" deforestation by the state is desirable. This view is reflected in the
assumptions underlying the state's objective function. Given this view, the model
provides an explanation of the commonly observed "aggressive" behaviour of the state
in forest conversion. By bein g the leader the state not only increases its own forest
clearing and income, but it wil also reduce what is considered the real environmental
problem -- local deforestation.
6 Discussion
We have studies three different empirically relevant cases of state-local games,
corresponding to different assumptions about the local economy, the local cost effects of
state deforestation, and the structure of the game. The number of possible games by
combining these assumptions is much larger, and Appendix 2 gives an overview of 12
possible games.
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In the first case of a poor, isolated local community, the response of the local
community was determined by the survival needs. Higher state deforestation entails a
loss in forest deri ved income, which must be compensated for by converting more forest
in to agricultural land; hence local deforestation wil increase.
The sec ond case was used to ilustrate a loe al-led land race. The local community uses
its position as the leader in a Stackelberg game to squeeze the state. State deforestation
is costly to the local community, and the community knows that by increasing own
deforestation, state deforestation wil be reduced. This provides an incentive for higher
local deforestation compared with a Cournot equilibrium, and overall deforestation wil
also be higher. The response to an exogenous increase in state deforestation is
ambiguous in this case. Jf the income effect is strong relative to the substitution effect,
local deforestation wil also increase. On the other hand, if the substitution effect
dominates in an autarky, or the households are unconstrained in the labour market
(small, open economy), then local deforestation wil be reduced.
In the third case, the state is the leader in a Staekelberg game, there is strong
competition for land (land scarcity effect dominates), and the local community is well
integrated into the regional/national economy (small, open economy). In this situation
the state wil use its leader-position to squeeze the local community. The local level of
deforestation is determined by the relative profitability of forest conversion and
agriculture compared to off-farm employment opportunities, and not by survival needs.
The local response to more state deforestation is then reduced deforestation.
Combining the analysis of the three cases with the overview of Appendix 2, we are now
able to make some general conclusions regarding the two main questions raised in this
paper: which game structures pro mote deforestation, and what is the local response to
higher deforestation by the state.
Whieh games promote deforestation?
In the small, open economy situation with small infrastructure effects (backward
bending local response curve), a Stackelberg game with either the state or the local
community as leader gives more overall deforestation than a Cournot game. The leader
wil use its position to squeeze the follower. Since the "squeezing effort" by the leader is
larger than the "squeeze" of the follower, the result is more deforestation than in a
Cournot equilibrium. This was the situation both in case 3 where the state was the
leader, and in case 2 where the local community was the leader.
One might think that a leader would take some responsibility for environment al
conservation and the provision of the public good, and that the Stackelberg games
therefore reduce overall deforestation, cf. the discussion in Baland and Platteau (1996,
chap. 5). This is not the case here. Each player knows that increased own forest clearing
wil reduce the clearing by the other player, thus forest clearing is less costly for the
leader.
How robust is this result, or, in other words, wil Stackelberg games always lead to more
deforestation? Consider first garnes where the state is the leader. When the local
response curve is backward bending, either due to strong infrastructure effect or strong
18
income effects, more state deforestation wil increase local deforestation. Forest
appropriation has become more costly to the state when they take into account the local
response. This provides an incentive for the state to reduce own deforestation, and the
result is less overall deforestation. The critical factor in determining whether a
Stackelberg game with the state as the leader wil lead to more or less deforestation is
therefore the slope of the local response curve.
In situations where the local community is the leader, we found in case 2 that
irrespective of whether income or substitution effects dominate, the Staekelberg
equilibrium yields more deforestation than the Cournot equilibrium. This assumes that
the land scarcity effect dominates the infrastructure effect in the local cost function. If
the infrastructure effect dominates, however, the conclusion is reversed. This situation
yields an intuitvely rather strange (though logically correct) result: the local community
wil reduce its own clearing to pro mote state clearing, which is beneficial to them, cf.
Appendix 2. The empirical relevanee of this result is unclear.
In conclusion, even though we found in cases 2 and 3 that the Staekelberg equilibria
give more deforestation than the Cournot equilibrium, this conclusion in sensitive to the
other assumptions. In particular, in situations when the local response curve is forward
bending, a income maximizing and rational state should as a leader reduce its level of
forest clearing (compared to the Cournot equilibrium) as state deforestation stimulates
local deforestation with a loss of forest deri ved benefits to the state.
When does state deforestatìonfuelloeal deforestatìon?
The second main question is in which situations increased forest appropriation by the
state wil stimulate local forest clearing. The answer is quite simple: if the local
response curve is backward bending, more state deforestation reduces local
deforestation. In other words, when (i) the infrastructure effect is small, and (ii) the
income effect is small in an autarky, or in small open economy, higher state
deforestation wil to some extent replace local deforestation. The result holds in all three
game structures.
Jf either the infrastructure effect or the income effect in an autarky (or both) are strong,
the result is reversed. State deforestation fuels local deforestation in any of the three
games. The case with strong infrastrueture effect has received some attention in the
literature on tropical deforestation. It is generally argued that plantations, logging and
other large-scale projects provide infrastructure, particularly roads, which gives farmers
easier access to primary forest. In this way state appropriation may increase the net
marginal benefits of agricultural expansion and thereby deforestation by the local
community. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the "logging-shifting
cultivation tandem", common in many Asian countries (Grainger, 1993).
The other possibility for a state stimulated local deforestation is when the need to
survival determined the local response (strong income effects), which was discussed in
relation to case 1.
The local level of deforestation is also affected by the game played, as discussed above.
Moving from Cournot to a game with the local community as the Stackelberg leader
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wil increase local deforestation if the infrastrueture effect is weak. Local deforestation
wil decrease if the infrastrueture effect is strong, although this is considered an odd
case. Moving from a Cournot game to a Stackelberg game with the state as the leader
wil always imply less local deforestation, irrespective of the slope of the local response
curve. Thus by playing the role as a leader the state wil always induce less local forest
appropriation. Note, however, that the state's strategy for achieving this wil vary with
the slope of the local response curve.
If both players want to be a 1eader, we get a situation with Stackelberg warfare which
might, for some period of time, lead to excessive forest clearing, even though this is not
a stable (Nash) equilibrium. This situation is discussed further in Appendix 3.
From the table in Appendix 2 and the above discussion we can conclude that the
qualitativeanswer to the question about the local response to higher state deforestation
is robust with respect to the type of game played, whereas it is sensitive to the local cost
structure and market assumptions. The other question raised relates to whether a
Staekelberg game wil result in more deforestation than a Cournot game. In addition to
the assumptions about local expansion costs and markets, the structure of the game also
matter. Moreover, in the very relevant case when land scarcity and income effects
dominate (as in case 2), the answer not only depends on whether we have a Cournot or
Staekelberg game, but also who is the leader in the game.
Aforward-then-baekward bending loeal response eurve
One could argue that a forward bending local response curve can describe a forest
abundant situation: there is plenty of forest land for expansion, hence there is no strong
spatial competition (land scarcity effects small). The main constraint on agricultural
expansion is accessibility, and state con vers ion is commonly linked with the provision
of infrastructure which reduces access costs. Furthermore, a large area of virgin forest
means that the reduction in benefits from that forest is relatively small (the absolute
value of t¡¡ is small, cf. (11)).
A plausible hypothesis is therefore that for large values of HF (low values of HL and HS)
the slope of the response curve of the local community wil be positive. For small values
of HF, on the other hand, the competition for remaining land is more intense and a
further reduction in virgin forest has strong negative impacts, thus the slope wil be
negative. Such a possible path is reflected in the assumptions made about c(HF,Hs), cf.
the discussion in relation to (2).
This hypothesis of a forward-then-backward bending respons e curve of the local
community is ilustrated in Figure 4. Consider a Cournot game. The response of the
local community of a shift in the state's response curve now depends on the initial
situation. In case A, where state appropriation is small, the local community wil
resp ond by increasing its appropriation of virgin forest. In case B, the response wil be
the opposite.
20
HS
respanse curve for the local community
respanse curve for the state
L
H
Figure 4: The case with a forward-then-backward bending response curve for the local
community.
The hypothesis of a forward-then-backward bending response curve suggests that in
fores t abundant situations increased state appropriation wil stimulate forest clearance
by the local community, whereas it wil discourage it in a setting with little forest left to
expand on. Historically, most countries showa downward trend in the forest cover (the
forest transformation hypothesis). Related to the hypothesis of Figure 4, one could argue
that at the early stages of this transition, state clearing works in tandem with local
clearing, whereas they compete at later stages.
A baekward-then-forward bending ioeal response eurve
Jf we instead of looking at the infrastructure effect focus on how the strength of the
income effect affects the shape of the local response curve, we may get the opposite
story to the one just told. Consider a situation when the infrastructure effect is small
(and not dominating at any level of HS), with little forest appropriation by the state
initially and a relatively high local income leveL. The response of the local community of
increased state fores t appropriation wil be to reduce its own deforestation, cf. the
discussion of case 2 and Angelsen (1996a: Model Il). As the forest appropriation by the
state increases, local income is squeezed, and approaches the subsistence leveL. Beyond
a certain point it is possible that the response to a further increase in state fores t
appropriation wil be dominated by the need to meet the subsistence requirement, thus
the response curve becomes forward bending. In this way we could argue for a
backward-then-forward sloping response curve, or the mirror image of the one presented
in Figure 4.
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Figure 5. A backward-then-forward bending local respons e curve.
The C-shaped local response curve suggests the opposite development compared with
the one discussed in relation to Figure 4. When state appropriation is relatively low,
state deforestation to some extent replaces local deforestation (A). As the state increases
its forest appropriation, it wil promote local deforestation (B). Combining the
arguments underlying the forward-then-backward and the backward-then-forward
bending hypotheses could yield that either of the hypothesis wil dominate, or an
S-shaped or an inverted S-shaped local response curve. The exact shape is, of course, an
empirical question. One lesson is that there are several different effects of higher state
appropriation to consider, and therefore a number of possible shapes of the response
curve.
Cooperation on forest management
The models of this paper can be utilized to ilustrate the potential and problems of
cooperation in forest management and conservation. Consider case 3. The shaded
eye-shaped area in Figure 3 gives the set of combinations of HL and HS where both actors
have at least as high income as in point B, Le., the area for Pareto improvements. The
well-known problem is that even ifboth parties would gain from being inside the shaded
area compared to B, both would also have an incentive to defect an agreement. Related
to the binary choice game literature, the choice between B and any point within the
shaded area could be considered a prisoner's dilemma game. 
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The issues of community participation, co-management or state-local partnership in
forest conservation can be viewed as attempts to establish a cooperative solution within
the shaded area. Both agents reduce their conversion of forest to contribute to the
preservation of the collective good -- primary forest. We shall not pursue the discussion
about the design of such contracts, just note that the contract curve wil be the line
where the iso-profit curves of the two agents tangent each other. Chopra et aL. (1990,
11 This binary choice game literature normally considers garnes with simultaneous moves
(Cournot), and not sequential moves (Staekelberg) as here. The problem of making
self-enforceable agreement is, however, similar in both the Cournot and Staekelberg garnes
of this paper.
22
chap. 6) provide a discussion of state-local contraets in forest management through the
application of a bargaining modeL.
The games can also be used to explain why there are limited incentives for each party in
unilateral actions for forest conservation. Reduced state appropriation wil result in mote
local conversion in case 3, or more generally in games with small infrastrueture and
income effects. Particularly, if the slope of the response curve for the local community is
c10se to minus one, a reduction in forest conversion of one hectare by the state wil be
offset by an almost equal increase in local deforestation. From (11) we see that this wil
be the case if c2 and rn are close to zero. The first implies that the co st reducing effect of
infrastrueture provision is small; the second that the gross marginal benefits of forest
conversion are relatively constant, which wil be the case when the products are sold in
a large market, and there are few constraints on the labour input, for example, through
migration. In this situation, the conservation effect of unilateral actions by the state wil
be negligible.
As a corollary to the above result, we also get that unilateral conservation efforts by the
state wil be particularly effective in the cases where state appropriation fuels local
deforestation, as the local forest conversion wil be reduced if the state decides to reduce
its own. Unilateral conservation efforts by the local community wil always be met by
increased deforestation by the state.
Case 2 is similar to case 3 with respect to the possibilities for co-management of forests,
with the role of the state and the local community reversed, whereas case 1 yields some
new and interesting results. With a forward bending local response curve, it may well be
that the local community would prefer the Stackelberg equilibrium with the state as the
leader to the Cournot equilibrium, cf. Appendix 3. In fact, if we limit the discussion to
the case when the land scarcity effect dominates the infrastrueture effect, we always get
that the local community would prefer to be the follower in a Staekelberg game
compared to a Cournot game. Whereas this is a rather unusual result in a Staekelberg
game with quantities as the decision variable, the logic is straightforward. With a
forward bending local response curve, the state wil as a Stackelberg leader reduce its
deforestation compared to the Cournot equilibrium. This wil benefit the local
community. Furthermore, as show n in Appendix 3, the local community may even
prefer the state to be the leader to being a leader itself in a Staekelberg game.
Whereas our modellng framework does not provide any theory for which game that wil
be played, one could intuitively expect a Cournot game with small infrastrueture and
strong income effects to be an unstable one; both the local community and the state
would prefer a Stackelberg game with the state as the 1eader. This is, however, a
premature conclusion. As further discussed in Appendix 3, there is no strictly dominant
strategy for the state nor the local community in a game of leader selection.
7 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper has explored some possible strategic interactions between the state and a
local community in games of appropriation of forest land. Particular attention has been
given to the assumptions made about the local costs of land expansion and the degree of
market integration. We found that Stackelberg games with either the local community or
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the state as the leader give more deforestation than Cournot games. The leader uses its
position to squeeze the other actor, and the net result is more deforestation. In this way
the kind of strategic behaviour that arise in Stackelberg games is bad from a forest
conservation viewpoint. This is a robust result irrespective of the assumptions made
about the strength of land scarcity v. the infrastrueture effects, and the income v.
substitution effects.
The second main question raised in this paper was under which circumstances higher
forest appropriation by the state also wil promote local deforestation. Contrary to the
conclusions on the first question, the answer is now highly sensitive to the assumptions
about the costs of local expansion and the local economy. If the infrastructure and/or the
income effects are strong, i.e., the local response curve is forward bending, the state will
stimulate local deforestation. If none of these effects dominate, we get conc1usions
similar to a more conventional duopoly game: higher state appropriation wil squeeze
the local community. These results are robust with respect to the assumptions made
about the structure of the game (Cournot or either of the Stackelberg games). In some
respects, this should be viewed as good news since the assumptions about the structure
of the game may be the most difficult to test empirically.
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Appendix 1: The developmental state
We have assumed throughout the paper that the state maximizes own income, thus
disregarding the effect of state deforestation on local income or welfare. A more general
formulation of the state's objective function is that the state gives a certain weight ('0 to
local income relative to state income (we assume the small, open economy situation);
(21) Max W= S+yL; y'è O
The case with r= O can be defined as the predatory state, as assumed in the models. The
developmental state could be defined as y'è 1, cf. the discussion in Angelsen (1996b:
chap. 3.3). What are the implications of introducing a more development oriented state
in the models? The first order condition of the state's optimization problem is now;
(22) sl+Yl2=0
Assuming r;: O and l2 .. O (land scarcity effect dominates infrastructure effect) and
given that Sl1 .. O, it follows that the "new" response curve for the state lies below the
"old" one in the HL_Hs diagrarme, and the distance between the "old" and "new" one is
larger the larger r is. Thus in the case with small infrastrueture effects (backward
bending local response curve), introducing a more development oriented state results in
less state and more local forest clearing.
In the case where infrastructure effects are strong (f2 ;: O), the state's "new" response
curve wil lie above the "old" one. With a forward bending local response curve, the
effect wil be both more state and local forest clearing. The slope of the state's response
curve is now given by;
(23) dHS* _ _ S12+Y121dHL - Sll+YI22
ln .. O, whereas l2¡ = l12 can be either positive or negative as discussed above. However,
it can be shown that l2¡ ;: ln' We cannot a priori exc1ude the possibility that the state's
response curve is forward sloping, when l21 ;: O and r is large, although this intuitively
appears to be an odd case.
Note that since the state cannot control local deforestation, the welfare optimum cannot
be reached even if we set r = 1. Thus even wïth a developmental state we are dealing
with second best solutions.
The introduction of a broader state objective does not fundamentally change the game,
although it wil affect the location and slope of the state's response curve. The
introduction of a more developmental state could be discussed as a downward shift in
the state's response curve in the case where the infrastrueture effect is small, and an
upward shift when this effect dominates the land scarcity effect.
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Appendix 2: Summary of possible games
By varying the three key assumptions focused on in section 2, we may distinguish
between 12 different games. The conc1usions in the games on the two main issues raised
are summarized in the table below.
Cost structure and market Type of game
assumptions for the local community 1. Sequential moves
Simultaneous (Stackelberg)
moves 2. Local 3. State as
(Cournot) community the leader
as the leader
A. Income max. (small, i. Land scarcity I: n.a. I: higher I: higher
open economy), effect dominates Il: decrease Il: decrease Il: decrease
or utility max. (autarky) (Case 2) (Case 3)
when substitution effects ii. Infrastructure I: n.a. I: lower I: lower
dominate income effects effect dominates IL: increase Il: increase Il: increase
B. Local utility i. Land scarcity I: n.a. I: higher I: lower
maximization (autarky) effect dominates IL: increase (same1) Il: increase
when income effects Il: increase
dominate substitution (Case l) (Case 2)
effects ii. Infrastructure I: n.a. I: lower I: lower
effect dominates Il: increase (same1) Il: increase
(Case l) Il: increase
l The leve! of deforestation wil be the same in the full belly case.
Table 1: The main results of diferent locaZ community-state gam es.
l: Total level of deforestation in the Stackelberg games compared to the Cournot
equilibrium.
IL: Effect on local deforestation of higher forest clearing by the state.
Regarding the market assumptions, the crucial differenee in the qualitative results is
between (i) the small open economy and the autarky when substitution effects dominate,
and (ii) the autarky when income effects dominate or the "full belly" case.
Of the 12 possible games, some have been studied in some details as cases 1-3. Two
important subsets have not, however, been discussed. ane is the conventional Cournot
duopoly game, that is, when the infrastructure and income effects are small (game 1.A.i
in the table). The local response curve is backward bending. The effect of higher forest
appropriation by the state is reduced local forest clearing, as in case 3.
Another important subset of games not dealt with is when the state is the Stackelberg
leader, and the local response curve is forward bending. This could be due to either local
autarky with full belly preferences or Chayanovian preferences with strong income
effects, or because state conversion increases the marginal net benefits of local
agricultural expansion. The conclusions are the opposite of the ones in case 3 (backward
bending response curve). The local response to higher state deforestation is more local
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deforestation. Due to this fact, the state wil as a leader reduce its leve! of deforestation
compared to the Cournot equilibrium: from the state's viewpoint higher own forest
conversion has an additional co st in terms of more local agricultural expansion and
reduced primar forest area. Contrary to the case with a backward sloping local response
curve, the Stackelberg game now helps preserve natural forest compared to a Cournot
game.
As in case 3, the leader (state) wil gain compared to the Cournot equilibrium. The local
community may lose or gain. Jf the forward bending response curve is due to strong
infrastructure effects such that also the indifference (iso-profit) curves are U-shaped (the
preferenee direction is north), the local community wil loose. If, however, the
infrastructure effect is small such that the indifference curves are inverted U-shaped and
the forward bending response curve is due to strong income effects in a local autarky,
the local community wil actually gain compared to the Cournot equilibrium.
As seen from the tab le, in a Cournot game and a Stackelberg game with the state as the
leader, the key difference between the different games is related to the slope of the local
response curve, i.e., the sign of l12 or u12. When the local response curve is forward
bending, either due to strong infrastructure effects or strong income effects (under
autarky), the local response to more state deforestation is also more local deforestation.
Furthermore, the Stackelberg game gives less forest clearing by the state and overall
compared to the Cournot game.
In a Stackelberg game with the local community as the leader, the critical factor is the
shape of the local iso-profit or indifference curves, i.e., the sign of l2 or u2. The condition
for "large infrastructure effects" is therefore not the same in the different types of game.
In this Stackelberg game the conclusions are more complex. In the cases when the
infrastrueture effect is small, the Stackelberg game gives more overall deforestation
compared to a Cournot game. The local response to higher state deforestation depends,
however, as shown in case 2 on the strength of the income effect relative to the
substitution effect. If the income effect is weak or we have a small, open economy, then
the result is less local deforestation than in the Cournot game.
Another sub-set of games not discussed is when the local community is the Stackelberg
leader, and the infrastructure effect dominates. State deforestation is beneficial to the
local community (lower expansion costs), thus, compared to the Cournot equilibrium,
the local community wil reduce its deforestation to push the state upwards along its
response curve. This appears to be a rather strange form of strategic behaviour of the
loe al community, and one could question the empirical relevanee of this case. It is
therefore not dealt with any further.
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Appendix 3: Staekelberg warfare and leader selection
We have seen that it is an advantage to be a 1eader in a sequential (two period) game,
thus we should expect that both players wil wish to have that position. We may
therefore get what is terme d Stackelberg warfare. In the case with a backward sloping
local response curve, this implies that both players choose an amount of forest clearing
higher than the Cournot equilibrium, hoping that the other wil be a follower. Both
players want to squeeze the other to clear less forest than they would have in the
Cournot equilibrium.
This situation clearly calls for a truly dynamic game modeL. Some major points can,
however, be ilustrated by using simple static binary game models, even though other
elements wil be missing (e.g., reputation building and credible threats). One possible
way of thinking about the game discussed in this section is that it is played prior to one
of the games studied.
Baekward hending ioeal response eurve
A Stackelberg warfare (SW) situation is ilustrated in Figure 6. Both the state and the
local community choose the amount of forest clearing they would do as Stackelberg
leaders (SS and SL respectively). The res ult is a leve! of overall deforestation which is
higher than both the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (C) and either of the two Staekelberg
equilibria.
HS
respons e curve for the local community
sw
response curve for the state
L
H
Figure 6. Stackelberg warfare with backward bending local response curve.
The warfare outcome is not stable: both agents wil be better off by mo ving back on
their response curve. We may therefore eventually end up in the Cournot equilibrium or
that one of the players accept being the follower. As long as the war is oIigoing, there
wil be excessive forest clearing. 
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lZ In the models of this paper forest is cleared once and for alL. To make this rather informal
discussion about leader selection more meaningful, one should think within a dynamic
perspective where forest clearing over time becomes more beneficial both for the state and
the local community, e.g., increasing prices of agricultural and forest products. The warfare
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The Staekelberg warfare can be ilustrated as a binary choice game between the players
about which strategy to pursue. Should one choose a deforestation level as a leader or as
a follower? The game is given in Table 2. The ordinal numbering (rankng) of the four
different outcomes is uniquely given from Figure 6, with 4 as the most preferred
outcome.
Local community
Follower Leader
State Follower 3,3 2,4
Leader 4,2 1,1
Table 2. A chicken game on the selection of the leader.
This is a chicken game, which has two possible Nash equilibria (in bold) with either
player as the leader and the other as the follower. We cannot within the game determine
which of these equilibria wil be the finaloutcome.
One could, nevertheless, provide some economic intuition to the game of leader
selection outside the formal modeL. If one player expects the other to behave as a leader
irrespective of what he is doing, then the best strategy would be to choose to be a
follower. Thus we have to bring in the issues of expectations and credibility. Are there,
for example, certain strategic bindings that make it more credible for one party to c1aim
that he wil be the leader? This could be in the form of officially approved plans for
forest conversion or capital investments. Such strategic bindings are mainly relevant for
the state, thus we could expect the state to be in a better position to make credible
commitments.
Forward hending loeal response eurve
A Stackelberg warfare appears to be most likely in a situation when the land scarcity
effect dominates the infrastructure effect (inverted U-shaped local indifference curves),
but it is stil possible that in a local autarky situation the income effect wil dominate the
substitution effect such that the local response curve is forward bending. This case is
ilustrated in Figure 7.
is therefore about the clearing of the virgin forest which has become profitable. To
incorporate such dynamic aspects in the formal model would complicate it significantly.
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response eurve for the loeal community
HS
response eurve for the state
L
H
Figure 7. Stackelberg warfare with backward bending local response curve.
The state's ranking of the four different outcomes is the same as in Table 2. The ranking
by the local community is more complex. We stil have that they prefer, by definition, to
be a leader in a Stackelberg game to the Cournot solution (SL )- C) and a Stackelberg
game with the state as the leader is preferred to Staekelberg warfare (SS )- SW).
However, with a forward response curve the local community now prefers the
Staekelberg solution with the state as leader to the Cournot solution (SS )- C). We then
have five possible loe al rankings:
RI: SS)- SW)- SL )- C
R2: SS)- SL )- SW )- C
R3: SS)- SL )- C )- SW
R4: SL)- SS )- C)- SW
R5: SL)- SS )- SW)- C
Figure 7 depicts the first ranking (RI). The game is presented in Table 3. At a first look
the obvious solution appears to be a Stackelberg game with the state as the leader (SS),
as it has the highest ranking for both the state and local community (Pareto dominating).
A Stackelberg game with the local community as the leader is, however, also a Nash
equilibrium. Jf we are in SL, the local community would not like to change strategy to
be a follower, and also the state is better off than in SW.
Nevertheless, the state knows that if it starts a warfare the local community would be
better off by choosing to be a follower, and in fact also better off than in SL. Similarly,
the local community knows that if they choose to be a follower, the state wil choose to
be a leader. In both cases we end up with the state being the leader. We cannot,
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however, conclude that this wil be the result since there are no single strictly dominant
strategy for either of the players.
Local community
Follower Leader
State Follower 3,1 2,2
Leader 4,4 1,3
Table 3. A game of leader selection with forward bending local response curve, and SS
)- SL for local community.
A possibly more empirically relevant case is when the local ranking is such that SL is
preferred to SS as in rankings R4 and R5 above. R4 is presented in Table 4. We see that
this game is almostidentical to the one given in Table 2, with the exception that in the
local ranking, SS is now preferred to C. We stil have a chicken game with two Nash
equilibria. Unlike the above game, the state have less reason to believe that the local
community wil choose to be a follower if Stackelberg warfare breaks out. This case is
more similar to the one with a backward bending local response curve, and we cannot
predict which of the two Nash equilibria that wil be the finaloutcome of the gare.
Local community
Follower Leader
State Follower 3,2 2,4
Leader 4,3 1,1
Table 4. A game of leader selection with forward bending local response curve, and SL
)- SS for local community.
ane can, however, conclude that it is less advantageous for the local community to be a
leader and disadvantageous to "give" that role to the state in the case of a forward
bending local response curve. The state wil, as a 1eader, choose to reduce its fores t
clearing, which wil benefit the local community.
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